Sin Reyes

If I have a thesis for the Latin American political question, it is this: At independence (and thereafter) demotic, nationalist, republican-democratic, & constitutionalist ideas brought in from Europe & the USA destroyed any and all chances at good government.

That is not to say Latin America was not often more properly governed, or that it is not superior to the global north in a number of areas. Rather, I merely aim to form a simple Reactionary answer… that progressivism is the root of the region’s sorrows.

Spain made a lasting fault with their colonial designs that reneged on formal aristocratic hierarchies among the creollo whites. Instead of an organic hierarchy between creollo whites/near whites and peninsulares, the crown split the two segments of the race apart and set the local leaders on a path to rebellion. Which was quick to arrive after the devastation the mother country endured by French and British armies.

One must realize that the Spanish Reactionary tradition is marvelous, but the liberal-constitutionalist tumultsgl of the 19th century had damned the already declining Castilian power as unworthy of its continued mastery over the southwestern portion of the globe. Bourbon era reforms had moved the region forward along the mercantilisitic model by 1800, to then be plopped down directly into the bonds of anglo-capitalism was an inconceivable transition. For three centuries prior Latin Americans had forged an economic arrangement that maintained leisured life at the top, fed by the traditional economies of the Indian communities. Issues of debt, credit, currency and capital were flung upon a civilization unfit for them. I cannot imagine a way of studying Latin America that would get one to conclude that liberal economics was “right for them”, in most every respect and in most every instance it was a disaster.  Over-reliance on precious metals was bad, but, there was always far more wealth in the area than in the tally sheets of financial institutions may have indicated. Their riches have always been undervalued.

Over the course of the 19th century modernization models were attempted earnestly but there seems to have been an acute leadership crisis that made implementation of “rational” praxis unlikely and stunted. The issue most at play was the absurd doctrine of federalization and split sovereignty, fanatically championed by liberal factions. From the start, conservative parties favored a centralized state structure that could manfully deal with the corruption and banditry of the provinces. Imperium en imperio was as pronounced a madness there as in the histories of our own countries. Local oligarchies were caught between anarcho-caudilloismo and populist nationalism, their lives at risk of the assassin’s bullet or to whoever could rig an election. Elections when honest were destabilizing, but the expectation that they should be “free” like the Yanque was a formalist nightmare.

Power determinism, as expressed in our theories, may stand alone and absorb the blame if one wishes. But there’s a ton of nuance here that’s worth checking out. I hope my presentation here will help the lazy Reactionary follower whom you can “red pill” with this predictive frame work, allowing him dialectical ease of mind for the whole business. When one knows that the fundamental political system was compromised then one does not need to worry this or that HBD fun fact about Basque or German or Nigerian genetic mixture in this or that place. Nor does one need to know which or what bad-deal the fiendish technocrat or the pudgy reformerista made with the Northern investor. Power was in improper hands, focused on the accomplishment of impossible goals.


Spiritually one sees as distinct pattern of decline, though a very different one than the American Northeast, more covert and less proselytic. Both Masons and Jesuits in the long run proved to be terrible and ruined everything!  Masonry initially infected Liberals more so than whatever the nominal conservative faction was. Eventually in Brazil they formed competing lodges, one for each party. The cultists were torn away from their transcendental duties to the great mass of society, unable to treat the Church as anything more than a rival camp to fight fancy h’w’yhite civilized POLITICS with. Semi-secret ritual amplified the sins of scheme and treasonous plot, aristocracy crumbled as it stood beside the Church, the middle class was often more intimate with the heresy. Modernization and politicization metastized the middle class which, now “educated”, began to see itself as a “middle class” along the false bourgeoisie consciousness. Secularism paired with liberal (then after 1910, leftist) class antagonistic pamphlets from Spain- and translations from French or English- tore the fabric of civil life to shreds.

Latin America’s Papistry is its most elemental ideological feature. For the first time ever we see evangelicalism entering thanks to tolerating constitutional provisions; blossoming so grandly, we can verify the long held Dixon claim that the Golden Circle could perhaps come under the sway of an energetic & living Protestantism. But the new confession is no less cucked than the Papa‘s. I find it also curious that those Reactionaries who tend towards the barbarism wing on the intensity-of-civilization-scale admire Latin America far more than the so called “throne & altar” civilizationophilic types who are coreligionists of the race in question. If one seeks to know of resistance to industrial society than perhaps the best example is the millions of peasants who continue to live to this very day a near seventeenth century existence. Envy for modern methods was wrong, the produce of industrial capitalism was fouled. Maybe they were never backwards, but faced the direction of truth and God.

I do not give the Latins much agency. And at the basic ideo-memetic level I cannot, though they reshaped the progressivist millstone to suit their particular backs considerably, they were positively infected via a European disease, much like the pathogenic illnesses of first contact, sweeping through in fire and blood. What immunity to liberalism we see in the helots’ disdain of the Republican party is due to the coarse consumerism of the lower mestizo orders. Beyond the sustenance of the family and the honor of close friends, the new Latins are, on average, rather unmolested by pressing topical questions. It has not been ideology, but those who could slow the whirlpool at the given hour, which produced regimes.

We counter signal upon nationalism a lot here, but there’s a way of looking at it all from a congruent nationalist perspective. From an Argentine/Colombian/Dominican nationalist point-of-view, one could say that the given nation rarely gave itself enough credit, esteem, or worth to fulfill the ethos needed for nationalism as a cohesive binder. This is too intersectional for an in-vogue altrightist to entertain, I don’t think it’s possible to get the ‘isolationist’ memester to ever care about this topic, they cannot understand outgroup nationalism, and that is fine. Aside from Mexico and Hispanics within the United States, there seems to be scant possibility of Latin American nation-states intervening northward in whatever political happenings are most dear to our restorations.

Guerre contre le Paraguay, l'Empereur du Bresil et ses deux gendres, le duc de Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha et le comte d'Eu, au camp d'Alegrete

Time is against us exploiting the political potential of the Latins, the last thirty years have evaporated dictatorial governments, Democratic influences steadily gaining headway. The fall of Bolivarian Socialism is happening too soon for RWDSs with a #conquistadormindset to carve up western Venezuela. Technocracy for New Order favors is pragmatic for the legislatures & presidentes, being allowed more freedoms by the weakness of Blue imperium. Now as it is, there is more congruence with domestic formal moneyed power, as America weakens it is maybe more wise to slowly taking back forfeited privileges than to counter-revolt.

For those interested in a project, I beseech you to find more source material. Especially for the 20th century, which even liberal Latin Americanists admit was far more troubling for the region than the long 19th. There is much more to say, but it is a mistake already talking in such sweeping generalities, further discussions on this will be of a closer scope.